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THE CONCILIATION PROCESS
By W. ELLISON CHALMERS
Associate Professor of Economics
"Mr. Employer, it looks as though we can't work out our dis-
agreement by this process," the local union president reluctantly
stated. "Of course we always knew we could go out on strike.
We've said all along we would if we had to and we believe we can
force you to come to terms. We don't want to, but it looks as
though there is no other way for us to get what we are entitled to.
We asked for a 20-cent increase because we are sure w^e are entitled
to it. W'^e believe we have demonstrated to you, beyond any logical
argument, that the increased cost of living and the profits of the
company entitle us to it. In the interest of being reasonable and
because we would rather live with the company in peace, we have
even gone so far as to say that we would accept 13 cents. Certainly
that is much less than we are entitled to. But we are not going to
compromise any further, and your ofifer of eight cents is impos-
sible."
"Such a statement just doesn't make sense," the general man-
ager responded. "On the one hand you say that you want to be
reasonable and don't want to strike; and on the other, you refuse
to give proper consideration to what we have said. We showed you
that your cost of living figures were wrong, that you have a com-
pletely inaccurate picture of the company profits and prospects, and
above all, that to grant your demands would endanger the competi-
tive position of the company, and therefore the welfare and jobs
of our employees. We can't stop you from striking, but let me
warn you that we are determined to stick to our position, because
it is a fair position, and sooner or later you will agree to what we
are now proposing."
Situations like this develop on many occasions in union-manage-
ment negotiations in the thousands of plants in Illinois. What
should the parties do next? The cjuestion is of urgent importance
to the employer, to the workers involved, and to their union. It well
may be of great importance to the public.
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WHY THE NEXT STEP IS IMPORTANT
Let us consider first the importance to the participants.
(1) The terms of the eventual agreement are important to each
side. As in the illustration, they often iuAolve wage rates. If the
workers are seriously affected by rising living costs, the size of the
negotiated pay increase directly alTects their welfare. Equally, if
the employer is really hard pressed to balance rising production
costs against competitively-set selling prices, the welfare of the
company is as directly involved. Although disputes vary greatly in
detail, they usually are of serious enough proportions on the sub-
stance of the disagreements that the economic interests of each side
are substantially or even vitally affected.
(2) The parties are also concerned with zi'Jioi the disagree-
ment is settled. Almost all disputes eventually end in settlements.
Whether settled without a showdown economic fight, during such
a fight, or after one, the final agreement represents a general ap-
proximation of the strength of the two sides. But zvJien they are
settled makes a great deal of difference. Directly involved in the
timing of the settlement is not only the direct economic cost of
conflict to each side but also the less apparent economic effect on
the employer's market, productivity in the plant, the future bar-
gaining position of the union and many other factors.
(3) In many disputes the resulting relationships are more
important than either the terms or the timing of the settlement.
For each of them a particular dispute is simply an incident in a
long process of living together. In most disputes the most important
prol^lems are of relationships. Management has its own problems of
establishing or continuing an effective management structure, dis-
cipline, and a spirit of plant cooperation. This problem affects not
only the bargainers but the whole range of management from the
foreman to the chief executive officer. The union has its own prob-
lems of morale and support.
Both management and labor, in addition, are concerned with
building their relations with each other. Although engaged in an
industrial dispute, management frequently wants to achieve a set-
tlement that will recognize the reasonable claims of its employees
and strengthen the cooperative attitudes of both employees and
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union leaders. The union rei)resentatives as fre(|uentl}- are anxious
to improve the quality of their dealino;-s with manas^enient. For
both, therefore, the fundamental concern is the effect of the solu-
tion of the specific dispute upon their future relations.
The public has a general, but nonetheless basic, interest in the
satisfactory conclusion of the disagreement. An essential element
of the free economy to which the country is committed is the free
collective bargaining process, carried on so that substantial justice
is reached between the economic interests and so that increasingly
large and efficient production results. It is fundamental to the
efficient working of the economic system that this bargaining be
carried out with the least possible interference with production.
Thus, it is of great public concern not only that stoppages be
a\oided whenever possible, but also that plant disorganization be
held to a minimum during the bargaining period.
WHAT WILL THE NEXT STEP BE?
When management and the union come to the deadlock sum-
marized in the opening paragraphs, they have a choice between four
different next steps. (1) They can agree to try harder to reach an
agreement by further bargaining. In a great majority of cases, it is
this first alternative which is chosen. If they can finally succeed in
reaching an agreement, they will have gained a closer working
relationship by voluntarily settling their differences. (2) They can
call on the services of a government conciliator to help them in
coming to an agreement. It is this process which this bulletin deals
with. (3) They can refer the cjuestion to some outsider as an arbi-
trator. This alternative has the advantage of maintaining a peace-
ful relationship between them and of assuring an impartial stud}'
of the various claims of the parties. It has the serious disadvantage
of abandoning their own responsibility to reach agreement. It
leaves both parties open to the danger that an unwise decision will
be made for them by an outsider and it i)rovides no assurance that
a deadlock is less likely to occur when they resume negotiations in
the future. (4) They can, as the union leader suggested, jiro-
ceed to a strike. There may be circumstances in which that
process will ])e considered by either the employer or the union
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nienibers as a necessary and therefore, in the long run, a healthy
development. But in most circumstances this will result not only in
a loss of income for both parties but may also endanger their
efforts to work cooperatively together.
STATE AND FEDERAL SERVICES
Because the last two alternatives are freciuently unfortimate,
for the parties as well as the public, both the state and federal
governments have provided agencies for conciliation and media-
tion. The agencies are designed to participate on a voluntary basis
in negotiations when the parties seek a settlement, but are unable
to compose their differences by their own means.
The State of Illinois has assigned to its Department of Labor
the responsibility to enter disputes either on its own motion or at
the request of either party directly involved. It maintains concilia-
tors who are assigned by the Director to specific disputes. The re-
(juest for their services may be made to the Director, Robert L.
Gordon, Department of Labor. Capitol Building, Springfield,
Illinois.
The national government maintains conciliators who are mem-
bers of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The request
for their services may be made to James J. Spillane, Regional Di-
rector, Chicago. Illinois.
These two services work together in order to send their limited
staffs to the places most in need of their services. Under provisions
of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, and the policy de-
cisions made under it, the federal service limits its participation to
those disputes which are interstate in their immediate implications
and which have, or threaten to have, a serious effect on interstate
commerce.
To imderstand the work of the conciliator we need to examine
the basic objectives of conciliation, the basic guides for action
which conciliators have developed from their wide experience, and
the particular procedures they use. Let us begin with the basic
objectives of the conciliation process.
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OBJECTIVES OF THE CONCILIATION PROCESS
\Miv does the government proxide conciliators? There is a two-
fold answer, explaining whv the government has such a service
and why labor and management use it. The objectives of concilia-
tion are: (1) to increase successful collective bargaining, and
(2) to maintain the maximum industrial peace.
To Increase Collective Bargaining
It is of fundamental importance, both for the parties directly
involved and for the government, that the collective bargaining
process work with the highest efficiency. At its best, the process
balances the economic interests of labor and management. This
recjuires a reasonably clear understanding by each side of its own
goals— economic, organizational and personal— and the goals
of the other party. The process goes beyond understanding to a
workable drawing together of these goals, recognizing that there
are conflicting as w-ell as common interests, that the short-run and
the long-time objectives may vary, and that the result needs to be
a realistic balance between these goals. In practice, there is not only
a drawing together of goals and attitudes, but also a balancing of
the economic strength of the two sides. At its best, the process rep-
resents the free choice of both management and the union as they
each select from the practical alternatives open to them. It is to be
expected, therefore, that when they have made their own selection
from the available alternatives, they will accept the agreement that
results and make it work. Finally, the process is expected to con-
tribute to the welfare of all parties, including a constant improve-
ment in their relations to each other.
In a great majority of cases the parties reach a reasonably suc-
cessful conclusion of their negotiations without needing any assist-
ance from a third party. It is when they become deadlocked, or
when there appears to be a real possibility that they will be stalled,
that the conciliator enters. Usually the negotiators are deadlocked
because (1) they have failed to adequately understand the goals and
problems of each other, or (2) there is present a degree of distrust
so that they have never really defined the problems that have to be
solved or there is a belief that the other negotiators are not making
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a serious and honest effort to reach agreement, or (3) on one or
both sides there is not sufficient determination to work out a soki-
tion of their separate and joint problems, frequently showing up
as an inflexible position by one or both sides regardless of the
problems of the other, or (4) there is an unwillingness on the part
of some or all of the participants to assume responsibility for the
conclusions which appear to be necessary.
When the Conciliator Enters
When the conciliator enters an industrial dispute it is his re-
sponsibility to size up the reasons why a deadlock has developed
and to help the parties get beyond it. He needs to help each party
to clarify its own objectives, to weigh them again in the light of
the facts, to understand the objectives and problems of the other
party, and to aid them in reaching a situation in which they can
realistically make their own choice of alternatives.
The conciliation process is a part of the collective bargaining
process and is not a substitute for it. The conciliator cannot sub-
stitute his judgments for those of the parties. He cannot decide
for them what their goals are and at what point their divergent
goals should be balanced. He cannot substitute his judgment for
their measuring of the comparative economic strength of the
parties. He must be certain that the parties accept the necessity to
make their own choices and the responsibility to live up to their
agreement.
The conciliation process can be very effective in assisting the
process of collective bargaining, but the better the parties are able
to meet the recjuirements of the total bargaining situation, the less
need they have for conciliation. Indeed, a basic problem for the
conciliator is to make certain that his services are used as little
as possible. In general, the more completely the parties are able to
work out their own relationships without third party assistance the
more likely they are to be building effective relationships wnthin
their own organizations and with each other. Thus, the first prob-
lem for the conciliator as he makes contact with the case is to de-
termine whether he should enter the dispute at all. He will not
decide that he is needed simply because there is lack of agreement
between the parties. Disagreement and dispute are the usual pre-
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liniinaries to final agreement. Frequently he can best serve the col-
lective bargaining process by declining to take part and by insisting
that the parties make further unaided and sincere efforts to reach
their own agreement.
Xor is this problem involved only in the preliminary decision on
participation. If participation is necessary at one point, it may well
develop later that the hurdle causing a deadlock has been overcome,
and that the parties should resume their own unaided efforts to
reach an agreement. And even the process of conciliation itself
requires that the conciliator's efforts to bring them to agreement
be limited to aiding them to understand and work their own way
through their problems to a drawing together of goals.
To Maintain the Maximum Industrial Peace
In general, both sides in the bargaining process prefer a peace-
ful conclusion of their negotiations. For both employer and worker
the costs of a stoppage are usually high. In addition, the relation-
ship which each is striving to build up with the other may be
seriously damaged by an economic fight. Of course, these generali-
zations are not always true. There may be special circumstances
for one or even both parties that lead them to believe that an eco-
nomic showdown will be desirable. In any case, it seldom happens
that either side is prepared to accept peace at any price. The basic
problem for each participant is to determine what are the costs to
each side of an economic conflict and to weigh the advantages of
the peaceful means that may be available.
It is the role of the conciliator to help the parties choose peace.
As a representative of the public interest, he represents the general-
ized interest of labor and of management for peaceful and there-
fore constructive labor relations. More than this, he represents the
public interest in avoiding the secondary effects of a stoppage of
production: the loss of worker income, the loss of profits, and the
emotional conflicts that result. In part his job is to help the parties
see more seriously and vividly their own self-interest in a peaceful
settlement. ]\Iore than that, he has a responsibility to insist that the
parties look realistically at their public responsibility to seek a
peaceful way out.
Applying this second objective — aiding in the preservation of
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industrial peace— requires as keen judgments of the conciliator as
does the first, of increasing collective bargaining. Frequently, the
serious stage of collective bargaining is not reached until each side
has gone a long way in testing out how determined the other side
is to stick to a proposition. Thus the free collective bargaining
process can, and frequently does, involve threats of strikes by
unions and the taking of unyielding positions by employers. In such
circumstances, the conciliator has to find a balance between his two
objectives. Too great an emphasis on the needs for industrial peace
may interfere with the necessity for the parties to make their own
maximum efforts in collective bargaining. On the other hand, too
great passiveness by the conciliator as a deadline nears or during
the course of a strike will prevent the conciliator from making his
highest contribution to the industrial peace which the long-run
interests of the parties and particularly of the public reciuire.
ABILITIES CONCILIATORS NEED
Obviously, these twin objectives need to be applied by indi-
vidual conciliators. Since the success of conciliation depends so
largely on an intimate understanding of the real issues involved
and of timing, the individual conciliator's abilities are crucial. To
be successful the conciliator must be gifted in his ability to meei
and deal with people in such a way as to inspire their confidence in
him. He must have integrity and they must believe in his integrity.
They must be convinced that he understands his job and can de-
velop maneuvers and ideas which will contribute to the successful
working out of their dispute. He must have a calm temperament
that can handle conflicting personalities and possibly violent emo-
tions. He needs a keen insight into the reasons why people act as
they do, and a sympathetic understanding. The whole process very
largely depends on his temperament.
The conciliator needs to know the entire range of industrial
relations. He needs to understand fully the subtleties of the collec-
tive bargaining process and its many variations. Some part of this
understanding he may get by specialized training, but a great deal
of it he must gain by personal experience, both as a conciliator and,
earlier, as a labor or management participant.
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BASIC GUIDES FOR THE CONCILIATOR
A governmental service organized for the twin objectives noted
above and composed of well-qualified conciliators might let the man
assigned handle each case according to his own best judgment. But
more than "good judgment" is necessary. Experience has developed
a set of objective guides to action. They indicate the approach fol-
lowed by the successful conciliator. What are these basic guides for
the conciliator?
Be Impartial. The conciliator must avoid both personal bias
and other social objectives. Such an edict does not mean that the
conciliator is without opinions on successful relationships between
management and the union. We have already indicated that he
must be an industrial relations expert. He must have clear opinions,
therefore, on a wnde number of the problems that arise at the bar-
gaining table or that lie unspoken behind the dispute he is dealing
with. The requirement of impartiality does not mean that he should
be without opinions on the procedures or even the terms that would
be most likely to bring the dispute to a successful conclusion.
Finally, it cannot be assumed that the conciliator, any more than
any other human being, is completely without bias.
Impartiality Is a Subtle Problem. It requires that the con-
ciliator eliminate from his judgment on the case whatever biases
he may have, whether they be economic or personal. It requires that
he avoid personal prejudice. He needs to concentrate exclusively on
helping the parties to an agreement on any terms which they are
both prepared to accept. He seeks to promote effective collective
bargaining and industrial peace without being influenced by any
other personal convictions or social purposes.
Know the Case. The conciliator must know the goals of
the parties and the background of the case. Like every other prob-
lem in human relations, the issues are almost always more subtle
and more complicated than appears on the surface. Indeed the
fundamental issue may be an efi^ort to deal with a problem that
is not even mentioned in the formal statement asking that the pro-
posal be accepted. To suggest a few possibilities: The real drive
behind the management position in our illustration may be the chief
barsrainer's desire to establish a record for himself with his ownb
" 0^ ILL Lia
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superiors. It may be a need to moderate the strength of the union
by besting them in the bargaining. It may be an expected shift in
management organization which will affect the positions of the
chief bargainer and the others on the management team. Or it may
be that the workers haven't been putting out their best personal
effort.
On the other hand, the union committee may be concerned
principally with the loyalty of workers to the union. The main
problem may be a matter of prestige between leaders in the local
or in the international. Behind it may lie a desire to find a peaceful
solution or the belief that the union's interests are best served by
an open conflict. There may be frictions within the union bargain-
ing committee that have meaning in themselves or are symptoms of
other problems in the shop.
Relationships Between Personalities
Each negotiation involves personalities as well as issues. Some
of the most important elements of the problem may lie in the rela-
tionships between personalities, either on the same side or across
the bargaining table. The conciliator must understand such personal
relationships and the ways he may approach the individuals in
order to work with them most effectively.
Gain the Confidence of the Parties. The conciliator cannot
get a full understanding of the dispute ^until the parties have ac-
cepted him. This recjuires not only that he maintain his personal
integrity and impartiality but also that they be convinced of both.
His actions have to be based on the impressions he makes on the
parties as well as on his own convictions. As they accept his im-
partiality and ability and as they recognize that he needs fully to
understand the dispute, both parties will gradually reveal their own
problems and objectives. When this sound relationship has been
established, the conciliator is in a position to make realistic and
acceptable suggestions.
Help the Parties Understand Their Own Problems. Nego-
tiations frec|uently bog down because of misunderstandings. These
may be as simple as the result of faulty speech or hearing. They
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are more Hkel}- to result from a too limited knowledge of the eco-
nomic facts in the dispute. These facts may relate to wage rates
and wage relationships within the plant, or between plants, or to
more complicated problems of production, organization, or human
welfare. Whatever they may be, they need to be pretty well under-
stood before the parties can form their own bargaining adjustments
to them.
Help the Parties Find the Area of Agreement. Even in a
dispute in which only one issue is formally expressed, elements of
the issue w^ill have different values for each of the negotiators. If
a deadlock is developing it is the job of the conciliator to help the
parties balance off these interests by a compromise that saves
the most possible for each. When several issues are in dispute, the
balance is more complicated, but may be achieved more easily.
Do Not Undercut Negotiators. The representatives at the
bargaining table, in almost all cases, have been given powder to
represent their group. If the conciliator seeks to displace them, he
is defeating the long-run objective of voluntary choice by the
groups for the sake of short-run success at the bargaining table.
It is his responsibility to work with the groups as they appear at
the bargaining table.
Encourage Participation of More Responsible Agents. With-
out trying to readjust the power structure of either side, the con-
ciliator may find it desirable to try to bring more responsible agents
into the bargaining process. In general, the bargaining process
should be conducted on each side by executives who have the power
and are able to make commitments during the course of negotia-
tions. The process must include a mutual study of the problems of
the other side. Such a study must be done by those responsible for
decisions. Bargaining is also a process of compromise that equally
needs the participation of those with authority. The conciliator
needs to make sure that enough authority is available on either side
to reach compromises and settlement when the opportunity presents
itself. On the other hand, the conciliator must be extremely careful
not to bring in additional bargainers if the present negotiator will
resent the move.
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Other Considerations
In addition to these seven basic guides, there are two others
that need to be considered. They represent additional aspects of the
bargaining problem beyond the fact that signatures need to be at-
tached to a formal document. They are important because they con-
tribute to successful collective bargaining. But they should not be
permitted to interfere with the immediate objective of industrial
peace.
Help Make Terms as Workable as Possible. As the parties
are negotiating toward an agreement they may well be considering
terms that are new to them. If agreement can be reached on these
terms, but they are likely to give rise to future and more serious
frictions, they should be modified during the negotiations if pos-
sible. In any such effort the conciliator needs to remember that the
first goal is immediate agreement and that future actions of the
parties are difficult to predict.
Seek Understanding of Terms. In many cases future serious
disputes would have been avoided if the parties signing a formal
document had understood more fully how the other party inter-
preted the words of the document. Within the limits suggested
above, the conciliator frequently can contribute to the prospects of
future peace by making sure that there is a common understanding
and agreement on the meaning of the clauses being recorded.
CONCILIATION PROCEDURES
The conciliation process usually follows a fairly standard pro-
cedure. Circumstances of each case will determine how the
procedure is applied.
(1) The conciliator usually enters, at the request of one or
both parties. His first contact will be with the requesting party.
Since, under most economic circumstances, the union is the party
initiating the pressure for change, the conciliator most frecjuently
begins by responding to a union request. Occasionally he enters on
the basis of a joint request. Such a request has the considerable
advantage to the conciliators and the parties of establishing with-
out question the impartial approach expected of him. It also repre-
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sents their agreement that his serxices are welcome and will he
acceptable to both.
(2) He meets separately with each. These preliminary con-
ferences are held at an early stage of the conciliator's participation
but not necessarily before the first joint session. They have three
objectives: (a) to establish a confidential relationship between the
conciliator and each party; (b) to provide a preliminary back-
ground explanation of the nature of the dispute; and (c) to seek
out the areas in w^hich it will be most helpful to resume the nego-
tiations. Such explorations are more or less extensive depending on
how much is necessary to accomplish these goals.
(3) He brings the parties into a joint conference. When
necessary, it is his decision on the time when a session would be
most strategic and its location.
(4) He guides the bargaining procedures. The conciliator
will chair the sessions, maintain order, recess and reconvene the ses-
sions, agree on the agenda, the order and the manner of presenta-
tion, and stimulate the negotiations when they lag or bring them
back to the subject when it seems appropriate. Obviously, his direc-
tion of this process is as limited and as subtle as possible.
Conducting Joint Conferences
(5) In the recesses between joint bargaining" sessions, he
conducts separate conferences with each. In these sessions he ex-
plores what lies behind the position of each side much more
intimately than is possible in the joint session. Here, he seeks (a) to
analyze with each what are the real issues and how vigorously each
side is determined to maintain its position, (b) to clear up misun-
derstandings, and (c) to seek out compromise alternatives.
(6) Wherever the occasion permits, the conciliator will
urge the parties to resume negotiations without him. Such a sug-
gestion may be made at any time during the course of the bargain-
ing. It should be made when the conciliator feels that such a pro-
cedure has any hope of succeeding.
(7) The conciliator suggests the consideration of alterna-
tive solutions. Up to this point, usually, he has chaired the meetings
and separately explored their problems, but has not tried to influ-
ence the actual joint negotiations. Where it appears necessary,
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however, the conciliator may move on to present several alternative
compromise solutions. These are designed (a) to "get them talking
again" by shifting their consideration to different alternatives,
(b) to develop from additional discussions the drives which have
not been adequately understood, and (c) to develop the feeling
that some kind of a compromise needs to be sought.
(8j He seeks participation of the superiors of one or both
parties. As indicated above, this is done when the participant
(a) has not sufficient authority and prestige to settle or (b) is
taking what appears to the conciliator as too limited and short-
sighted a view of his own interests and problems. It is done,
usually, by adding the superior to the bargaining group rather than
by replacing the original participant.
Suggesting Alternative Steps
(9) He may suggest alternative procedural steps. If the
negotiations appear to be too seriously deadlocked, if the problems
are serious enough, and the timing makes it necessary, the con-
ciliator may suggest one or another alternative procedural steps.
This may simply be the postponement of a deadline to permit time
for further negotiations or for the participation of some additional
representatives or for some outside event to happen that will influ-
ence the attitude of the parties. He may suggest a factual investiga-
tion before negotiations are resumed. Or the suggestion may be
for a change of location. Or it may be to refer specific issues to
arbitration. Or, in accordance with the Taft-Hartley Law, it may be
the formal recommendation that the employer's last offer be sub-
mitted to a vote of the employees.
(10) In a rare case there may be a final^ procedural step of
recommending to both parties the specific terms for a settlement.
Since this is a conciliation and not an arbitration process, such a
recommendation is not really the independent judgment of the
conciliator as to what "ought" to be the settlement, but is rather
' The procedural steps here considered are Hmited to those usually followed, to
the extent the circumstances require, by a single conciliator. This paper makes no
attempt to analyze the successful experiments with additional procedural devices
beyond the single conciliator, including the addition of a second or a third com-
missioner, the assignment of an additional conciliation specialist, the change of
location to a regional office or to Washington, the use of a tripartite mediation
panel or of a fact-finding board.
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the basis on which he beUeves agreement is most likely. To assure
himself of this in advance, he will hold separate discussions with
each party in advance and make the proposal only after it has been
worked out as probably acceptable to both. In most cases of this
kind, such a recommendation is merely a device for "saving the
face" or saving the bargaining position of each side because the
conciliator places on the table what each side is prepared to accept
but not to originate or sponsor.
SUMMARY
This analysis has considered the role of conciliation in the col-
lective bargaining process. Whenever labor and management have
difficulty in reaching an agreement peacefully, the government con-
ciliation services are available and on call. As this function is better
understood it can be more w'idely and wisely used to the advantage
of the parties themselves. Beyond that it represents the most im-
portant single device used by the government to assure ( 1 ) peace-
ful industrial relations and at the same time (2) the preservation
of voluntary and democratic processes in industry.







